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This working paper investigates the salience of and the position on Differentiated integration (DI) for 
the Austrian government. The analysis is based on both an analysis of government programmes, 
programmatic government speeches and parliamentary debates between 2004 and 2019/20. It shows 
that DI is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general DI concepts and models. 
Specific instances of DI were, of course, subjects of intense debates but, with very few exceptions such 
as the financial transaction tax as an instance of enhanced cooperation, rarely discussed with specific 
reference to DI. Overall, most Austrian parties are also not generally in favour of DI, quite the opposite. 
The dominant vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the 
same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Only one party has forcefully 
supported the development of a core Europe, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft 
Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, DI is mainly regarded as a 
means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) 
from areas of integration. 
Keywords 
Differentiated Integration; Austria; Parliamentary Debates; Enhanced Cooperation; Opt-out.   
Summary of Results 
I. Salience  
Differentiated integration (DI) is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to general 
concepts and models. Since 2004, the topic has only come up very infrequently in government 
programmes, programmatic speeches by the Chancellor or other members of the cabinet and 
parliamentary debates. Specific instances of DI, by contrast, are far more salient for the Austrian 
government. This seems to be more due to the instruments themselves, rather than to their DI character. 
Clearly, Schengen, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Fiscal Compact and the European Public 
Prosecutor, to name just a few instances, were subjects of intense debates. They are rarely discussed 
with specific reference to DI, however. The only exceptions are: the financial transaction tax (FTT), 
which was discussed in the context of the enhanced cooperation mechanism; regarding the opt-out 
mechanism, the introduction of a general opt-out option for all Member States from (certain) genetically 
modified organisms (GMO); and a limited domestic opt-out for hospital staff from the working time 
directive. 
II. Position 
Overall, most Austrian parties are not in favour of DI, quite the opposite. While the subsidiarity principle 
and concentrating on the main tasks of the European Union (EU) have always been important in Austrian 
discourse, the vision of the EU is that of a community of closely cooperating Member States with the 
same rights and responsibilities where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. Regarding the latter, criticism 
has especially focused on the United Kingdom’s (UK) opt-out regarding the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Interestingly, over time most parties use the term core Europe more rarely and 
rather refer to a rather negatively connotated Europe à la carte or Europe of two/multiple speeds. Only 
one party has openly and forcefully supported the development of a core Europe of the economically 
most successful Member States or net payers, namely the right-wing populist Bündnis Zukunft 
Österreich (Alliance for the Future of Austria, BZÖ). In this case, however, the support for DI is based 
less on an aim to allow a small group of Member States to move ahead in specific areas but more as a 
means to exclude groups of Member States (especially the financially more vulnerable or net recipients) 
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This report investigates the salience of differentiated integration (DI) in Austrian government discourse 
between 2004 and 2020. It also probes into the position of Austrian governments on the issue of DI in 
selected peak-salience years (2008, 2012, 2017-2019/20). Regarding the salience of DI, the results are 
based on counting DI-related keywords in a variety of document types. Regarding the position of the 
government, the results are based on a manual sentiment analysis of parliamentary debates. To this end, 
parliamentary debates were manually coded using Max QDA software. 
The material analysed for this report includes government programmes, Chancellors’ speeches, first 
government declarations, EU declarations, European Council statements and parliamentary debates. 
Appendix 1 provides an overview of all the documents analysed. German keywords (see Appendix 2 
for an overview) were searched using the stem of the word to include all permutations due to conjugation 
or declination. In addition, as actors sometimes use English terms, we searched for these as well (e.g. 
coalition of the willing, enhanced cooperation, opt-out, variable geometry and PESCO – Permanent 
Structured Cooperation).  
The assumption underlying the keyword counts is that the more a government talks about DI, the 
more relevant it is. While keyword counts in government programmes and PM speeches show the 
salience of DI at specific moments in time, analysis of parliamentary debates allowed us to identify 
trends over time and situational peaks. The list of keywords reflects three levels of abstraction. First, we 
ask if governments talk about DI at a conceptual level, i.e. by discussing the advantages and pitfalls of 
different models of DI. Second, we ask to what extent governments talk about specific DI mechanisms, 
such as enhanced cooperation and opt-outs from community policies. Finally, we ask what the 
differentiated policy fields which governments talk about most often are. Besides instances of enhanced 
cooperation and opt-outs from community policies, the report also looks at instances of inter-state 
agreements and external agreements. 
2. The salience of DI 
2.1 Government programmes  
To assess the salience of DI for the Austrian government, we first analysed the six Austrian government 
programmes1 between 2003 and 2020. The computer-assisted word count resulted in only two references 
to DI models, both of which were in the 2008 programme of the first Faymann government. In addition, 
we found a number of references to instances of DI in all the programmes, namely to security and 
defence policy, Schengen and Economic and Monetary Union, which are all related to the opt-out DI 
mechanism, and to PESCO, the financial transaction tax and the European Public Prosecutor, which are 
related to the enhanced cooperation DI mechanism. In both cases, the programmes mainly referred to 
the instances and only very rarely to the underlying mechanisms – with one exception in the 2013 
programme, which referred to enhanced cooperation in connection with the financial transaction tax (see 
Appendix 3). 
To investigate this further, two additional analyses were conducted. First, a qualitative analysis of 
the government programmes confirmed that the terms were rarely discussed in a more detailed DI 
context. For example, the 2013 programme of the second Faymann government mentioned the financial 
transaction tax three times, twice simply stating that the government intended to pursue its introduction, 
                                                     
1 Between 2002 and 2020, Austria had 7 governments, of which one, in 2019, was a caretaker government under Chancellor 
Bierlein after a successful no confidence vote against Chancellor Kurz. The Bierlein government did not draw up a 
government programme.  
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and once referring to enhanced cooperation: “The introduction of a financial transaction tax will be 
pursued. Austria will participate in an introduction within the framework of enhanced cooperation; in 
addition, it will continue its efforts regarding a preferable global introduction.”2 
Second, we ran a computer assisted word count analysis to measure the overall salience of the EU 
and EU-related topics in the government programmes. As Figure 1 shows, Europe and the European 
Union were of high, albeit slightly decreasing, salience in the 2002 to 2013 government programmes, 
with the highest relative salience in the 2003 programme of the coalition of the conservative ÖVP with 
the extreme right Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreich, FPÖ).3 The high salience of 
EU-related issues only changed with the first Kurz government in 2017, again a coalition of the ÖVP 
and the Austrian Freedom Party. Yet although in this government programme the greater relative 
salience of the term ‘Austria’ (österreich*) clearly indicates a more domestic outlook, references to the 
EU are still more frequent than those to all the other terms included. The programme of the current 
ÖVP/Greens coalition follows this trend: the salience of terms related to both Austria and the EU 
increased relative to the other terms, but overall Austrian topics remain more salient.  
Figure 1 - Salience of EU-related issues in Austrian government programmes 2002-2020 (relative 




Note: The terms used in the query were all permutations of, in this order, Austria*, EU*, social*, economic, government*, culture*, citizen* 
and politic*. 
One of the reasons for the relative frequency of EU-related terms is the fact that the government 
programmes include a section or chapter on EU integration, usually in combination with foreign policy, 
but also address EU policy issues throughout the whole programme. Therefore, each chapter outlining 
government plans in a specific policy area usually also mentions policies the government will pursue or 
support at the EU level.  
                                                     
2 “Die Einführung einer Finanztransaktionssteuer wird weiterhin vorangetrieben. Österreich wird sich an einer Einführung 
im Rahmen der verstärkten Zusammenarbeit beteiligen, darüber hinaus wird es die Bestrebungen zu einer möglichst 
weltweiten Einführung weiterführen” (2013 government programme, p. 105). 
3 The 2003 to 2007 coalition was the second involving the ÖVP and the FPÖ under Chancellor Schüssel. Especially the 
strong negative reaction within the EU to the first formation of the coalition in 2000, including sanctions, may have been a 
reason why the coalition put special emphasis on EU issues in its subsequent programme. It is also by far the shortest of 
the government programmes. 
2003 2007 2008 2013 2017 2020 
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2.2 Key Speeches by the Prime Minister (Chancellor)  
Second, we analysed the first speeches of the Chancellor4 after each election (government declarations) 
in both chambers of the Austrian Parliament and the ensuing debates. In the former, keywords related 
to DI played an even smaller role than in the government programmes. Overall, we found only five 
mentions in speeches in the lower chamber (National Council, Nationalrat, NR) and two references in 
speeches in the upper chamber (Federal Council, Bundesrat, BR). With the exception of the financial 
transaction tax (two mentions) the mentions referenced EU security and defence policy. Security and 
defence policy and Schengen also played somewhat bigger roles in the subsequent parliamentary debates 
(Appendix 4), while other instances of DI were hardly mentioned. Here, the timing of the first 
government declarations clearly played a role. In 2013, for example, most decisions regarding the 
establishment of the European Stability Mechanism had already been made. Chancellor Faymann did 
not refer to it in 2013, and the term was only mentioned once in the following Nationalrat debate.  
Figure 2 provides an overview of the aggregated relative frequencies of EU-related terms in the seven 
speeches and the following debates. It shows that the Chancellors’ speeches were overall more focused 
on Austrian politics than the government programmes, although references related to Europe or the EU 
were still fairly frequent – and more frequent than in the following parliamentary debates.  
Figure 2 - Salience of EU-related issues in first speeches and subsequent parliamentary debates 






Note: The terms used in the query were all permutations of, in this order, government, Austria*, EU*, social*, economic, politic*, citizen* and 
cultur* 
Third, we turned to an analysis of the Chancellors’ speeches on the occasions of the EU Council 
presidencies in 2006 and 2018 and found a very similar picture regarding DI. Here, we analysed 
speeches in the European Parliament (EP), speeches outlining the government’s priorities for the 
Council presidency and the subsequent parliamentary debates in the Austrian and European 
                                                     
4 The speeches for the 2017 and 2020 government were given by Chancellor Kurz and Vice Chancellors Strache and Kogler. 
We coded the latter too. The government declarations by Chancellor Kurz in both years were overall rather short and gave 
only a broad overview of the government’s vision for the next four years. The speeches by his vice chancellors went into 
some more detail, and especially Vice Chancellor Kogler (Greens) spent more time on EU issues in 2020, but DI hardly 
played a role. Chancellor Bierlein, in turn, defined the role of her unelected caretaker government as “verwalten, nicht 
gestalten” (caretaking, not decision-making) and did not give a programmatic speech. 
NR First Speeches BR First Speeches BR Debates NR Debates 
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Parliaments.5 Overall, DI hardly played a role in the speeches. In his statement in the Nationalrat in 
January 2006, Chancellor Schüssel mainly focused on the results of the European Council meeting on 
15 and 16 December 2005 regarding the 2007-2012 Multiannual Financial Framework. In addition, he 
gave a short overview of the government’s presidency priorities, focussing mainly on growth and 
employment, EU research policy, internal security, enlargement and the continuing debate on the EU 
draft constitution. Schüssel’s speech in the EP in January 2006 expanded this list of issues slightly, also 
highlighting EU energy security, touching on the Services Directive and mentioning the need for a 
financial transaction tax (without using the term as such). In 2018, the three main priorities outlined by 
Chancellor Kurz both in the national and the European Parliaments were external border control, Frontex 
and illegal migration, the development of the EU digital market and infrastructure, and the enlargement 
prospects for the western Balkans. None of the four speeches contained one of the specific key terms 
related to DI.  
It is perhaps not surprising that overall speeches on the occasion of taking over the Council 
presidency focus more on a united Europe rather than on different options for DI that may be interpreted 
as dividing the Union. DI issues were, however, overall also not salient in the ensuing debates, either in 
the Nationalrat or the European Parliament.  
In 2006 (see Figure 3), in both the Nationalrat debate and the debate in the European Parliament, 
Chancellor Schüssel was asked about French proposals for a “core Europe.” In the EP debate, another 
MEP also raised the question of a “two-tier Europe”’ (Europe of two speeds in German) with regard to 
the transitional arrangements regarding the free movement of workers, but Chancellor Schüssel did not 
take up either issue in his replies. The term ‘opt-out’ (here ‘opting out’), in turn, was mentioned twice 
in the Nationalrat, but in the context of a complaint by a Member of Parliament (MP) about an increase 
in “euro speak" and not with any connection to the mechanism as such. Finally, a reference to 
matrimonial property regimes was made by European Commission president José Manuel Barroso. 
  
                                                     
5 Neither Schüssel nor Kurz presented the Council presidency priorities in a plenary session of the upper chamber, the 
Bundesrat. 
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Figure 3 - DI keywords in speeches and parliamentary debates related to the 2006 and 2018 









In 2018, the only more salient DI issue in the Nationalrat was the financial transaction tax, which was 
raised by several Austrian MPs in the debate. In addition, one MP referred to a “two-speed Europe” but 
not in the context of formal DI but instead as a spectre due to differences between Member States 
regarding investments in digitalisation and digital access: “When it comes to digitalisation, we do not 
want a Europe of two speeds”(MP Stephanie Cox, Liste Pilz, 14 June 2018).6 In the European Parliament 
debate following Kurz’s speech in 2018, Schengen was the only more frequently found key term. While 
Kurz did not mention Schengen as such, either in his speech or his later reply, the issue was raised by 
several Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), mainly in relation to migration policy and the 
EU’s internal borders but not related to the opt-out DI mechanism.  
Unfortunately, we were not able to include Future of Europe (FoE) debates as no Austrian 
representative gave a FoE speech in the European Parliament. European citizens’ dialogues took place 
in Austria between June and November 2018 in the context of the Austrian Council presidency, but 
Chancellor Kurz did not give a specific speech on this occasion in the Austrian Parliament. The kick-
off for the citizens’ dialogues was celebrated in the context of the Europa-Forum Wachau in June 2018, 
                                                     
6 “Jene EU Länder, die bei der Digitalisierung EU-weit am weitesten vorne sind, sind es auch weltweit, und im globalen 
Kontext spiegelt sich auch wider, welche Länder in der EU weiter hinten sind. Das bedeutet … alle Mitgliedstaaten sollten 
mehr investieren, um den digitalen Binnenmarkt voll ausschöpfen zu können. Wir wollen bei der Digitalisierung kein 
Europa der zwei Geschwindigkeiten haben.” (Nationalrat debate, 14 June 2018).  
2006 EP Speech 2006 EP Debate 2006 NR Speech 2006 NR Debate 
2018 EP Speech 2018 NR Speech 2018 EP Debate 2018 NR Debate 
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but Kurz’s speech on this occasion is not available.7 According to the news coverage of the speech, 
however, Kurz mainly focused on the presidency priorities outlined above and did not discuss DI.8 
Finally, we also analysed the statements Chancellors made in Parliament related to European Council 
meetings. According to §74, para. 1 of the standing orders of the Austrian Nationalrat, the Government 
presents an EU declaration twice a year “in close proximity to the European Council meetings”9 to 
provide the Nationalrat with information on issues and the impacts on Austria and on the position of the 
government. These declarations can be made by any member of the government, but it is usually the 
Chancellor together with the Vice Chancellor or one other minister10 and very rarely a minister on his 
or her own. The declarations are then also transmitted to the Bundesrat in writing.  
As the word count for the 24 declarations indicates, DI overall was only occasionally salient (Figure 
4). DI models were only explicitly mentioned twice, both in the same declaration in 2011 referring to a 
multi-speed Europe. Similarly, the opt-out DI mechanism was the only one mentioned, twice each in 
two speeches in 2007 related to the British opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. As the count 
of DI instances shows, however, issues related to DI were somewhat more salient than the model and 
mechanism word counts suggest.  
Figure 4 - Salience of DI models, mechanisms and instances in government EU declarations, 
2004-2020 (absolute numbers) 
 
 
A breakdown of the references to DI instances show a clear focus on the financial transaction tax, 
Schengen, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Stability Mechanism (Appendix 5). 
Association agreements were not mentioned at all. Note, however, that the relatively low number of 
mentions regarding the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact is not really 
                                                     
7 The website of the Europa-Forum does not make the speech available, and a YouTube video of the whole speech was made 
private. See https://kurz-link.at/2JUsYQZ.  
8 E.g. https://www.nzz.ch/international/der-westbalkan-braucht-reale-eu-perspektiven-ld.1395912, 
https://www.kleinezeitung.at/politik/politikaufmacher/5448128/EuropaForum-Wachau_Kurz-plaediert-fuer-schlankere-
fokussierte-EU  
9 “EU-Erklärungen von Mitgliedern der Bundesregierung finden zweimal pro Jahr in zeitlicher Nähe zu einer Tagung des 
Europäischen Rates oder Rates der EU statt. Sie dienen der Information des Nationalrates über Themen des Europäischen 
Rates oder Rates der EU, deren Auswirkungen auf Österreich und die Positionen der Österreichischen Bundesregierung 
dazu.” 
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representative of the content of the declarations in 2011 to 2013, which often focused on the crisis and 
the related measures. Government representatives rather tended to use other terms related to the 
mechanism, such as ‘Schutzschirm’ or ‘Rettungsschirm’ (protective shield/parachute, a German term 
often used for ‘bailout fund’) (Figure 9). In addition, the specific oratory styles of the Chancellors and 
their colleagues play a role. While some use a term once, others repeat it several times for emphasis. 
Chancellor Gusenbauer, for example, mentioned the European Charter of Fundamental Rights in four 
consecutive sentences in his November 2008 EU declaration.  
These DI references were embedded in broader issue cycles in the EU declarations (Appendix 6). 
While the declarations in 2007 were dominated by the negotiations on the constitutional/Lisbon Treaty, 
the financial and eurozone crises became the topic from 2009 onwards, being replaced by the refugee 
crisis in 2015 and 2016 – even if the term crisis is overall not very often mentioned. Finally, from July 
2016 on, Brexit became the top issue even though government representatives only started using the 
term in 2017.  
2.3 Parliamentary Debates  
We then broadened the analysis and turned to parliamentary debates in both chambers of the Austrian 
Parliament between 2004 and 2019. Here, we had to focus on plenary debates, as the committees in the 
two houses meet behind closed doors and do not provide stenographic minutes.  
To start with an overview, Figure 5 provides the results of a manual search for keywords related to 
DI models using the Parliament’s search engine. It shows an overall very low salience of DI models in 
Austrian parliamentary debates, with an average of just over eight mentions a year (N=138). DI models 
were relatively more salient in the years between 2007 and 2010 with another, much lower, peak in 
2016. It is entirely possible that DI models played a greater role in committee debates. At the same time, 
we would argue that references in plenary debates, less frequent as they may be, do provide interesting 
insights given the public and media impact of plenary debates.  
As a comparison, we added the key term ‘future of Europe’ (“Zukunft der EU/Europas”) to the 
manual count (Appendix 7). The salience of the two sets of terms seem to follow somewhat different 
logics, with ‘future of Europe’ being salient in almost the opposite time periods to DI models. The only 
exception is the year 2007, for which we recoded a relatively high salience for both. Indeed, the 
correlation between the frequencies of the two terms is positive but extremely small with a Pearson’s r 
of .009.  
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A breakdown of the absolute numbers according to the different conceptual keywords related to DI also 
shows that the overwhelming majority of the references are to the DI model of an EU of multiple 
endpoints, and mainly to the term ‘core Europe’ (Kerneuropa), namely 67 per cent (Figure 6). These are 
followed by terms referring to a Europe of two or different speeds. The other keywords played no or 
only a very small role. We investigated this further by analysing the three peak years, 2007, 2008 and 
2010, where the overall picture looks very similar. Finally, we also included a breakdown for the most 
recent ‘peak’ in 2016, where the concept of ‘coalition of the willing’ became as salient as core Europe. 
Note, however, that the absolute number of references in 2016 is only eight (see Appendix 8).  
Figure 6 - Salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates 2004-2019 – breakdown by 
keyword (in percentages) 
 
 
DI mechanisms were slightly less salient in the parliamentary debates, with a total of 124 mentions of 
the terms ‘enhanced cooperation’ or ‘opt-out’ (Figure 7). A breakdown between the two mechanisms 
shows that the absolute frequency of the mentions followed different cycles. The opt-out mechanism 
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2011, 2014 and 2015. In 2011 and 2014, the debates focused almost entirely on the working time 
directive and the question of a general opt-out and a specific Austrian opt-out from the maximum 
working hours for medical hospital personnel. In 2007, by contrast, the debates focused on the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and the British opt-out in particular, and in 2015 on the opt-out option 
regarding the cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs).11 The enhanced cooperation DI 
mechanism, in turn, was mainly debated in 2012 and in connection with the introduction of a financial 
transaction tax, with only a few further mentions from 2015 to 2018.  
Figure 7 - Salience of DI mechanisms in parliamentary debates 2004-2019 (aggregated absolute 
numbers) 
 
Specific instances of DI, however, were far more salient in the parliamentary debates, even though the 
related mechanisms were generally not mentioned specifically. As Figure 8 indicates, the Austrian 
Parliament debated instances of enhanced cooperation throughout the period under investigation 
(n=1047), and especially intensely between 2008 and 2014, with another, smaller, peak in 2018. At the 
same time, its salience is driven almost exclusively by debates on the financial transaction tax, of which 
Austria is a strong supporter.  
Figure 8 - Salience of instances of enhanced cooperation in parliamentary debates 2004-2019 
(absolute numbers) 
 
                                                     
11 Directive (EU) 2015/412 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending Directive 2001/18/EC 
as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of genetically modified organisms 
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This is even more the case for instances related to the opt-out DI mechanism, which were discussed 
somewhat more evenly throughout the period (n=1303). Here, we also find an, albeit only slightly, more 
even distribution. While Schengen was the most intensely discussed instance, all other instances also 
played a role. 
Figure 9 - Salience of instances related to the opt-out mechanism in parliamentary debates 2004-
2019 (absolute numbers) 
 
While above we have focused on mechanisms and instances of internal DI, i.e. on forms of DI regulated 
in the EU Treaties, instances of external DI exist as well. Here, the most prominent mechanisms are the 
inter se agreements (ISA), which are international agreements between all or a subgroup of the EU 
Member States concluded outside of the Treaties, on the one hand, and association agreements between 
the EU and (groups of) other countries, on the other.  
Overall, inter se agreements (word count n=2125) were far more salient in Austria than association 
agreements (word count n=650) over the period under observation (Figure 10). The distribution of ISA 
mentions over time and in a breakdown according to the specific inter se agreements mentioned indicates 
that the high salience is almost exclusively due to the ISA concluded in the context of the eurozone 
crisis, namely the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact. Both, and especially the ESM, 
were subject to extensive debates in Parliament.  
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Regarding the four association agreements included in the analysis, the breakdown in Figure 11 shows 
that the European Economic Area (EEA) was by far the most frequently mentioned. The relationship 
between the EU and Turkey, by contrast, is a highly salient topic in Austria, but was mainly discussed 
in relation to a potential accession to the EU, which is opposed by most parties in Parliament. The 
customs union with Turkey, in turn, was very rarely mentioned. More surprising is the rarity of mentions 
of the Eastern Partnership given Austria’s geographical position. One reason might be that debates in 
Austria have, especially more recently, mainly focused on the western Balkans rather than the countries 
included in the Partnership.  
Figure 11 - Salience of association agreements in parliamentary debates 2004-2019 (percentages) 
 
3. The government position on DI 
In this section, we analyse the position of consecutive Austrian governments and in parliament towards 
DI. The analysis is based first on a careful reading and qualitative assessment of the government 
programmes and chancellor speeches mentioned in part 1 and second on a qualitative coding of 
parliamentary debates in both houses of the parliament in 2008, 2012 and from 2017 to 2019.  
3.1 Government programmes and speeches 
3.1.1 DI models  
As the analysis in part 1 indicated, DI was clearly not a salient issue in the context of government 
programmes, government speeches or the following parliamentary debates. Despite the low salience, 
however, it seems clear that the Austrian government is not in favour of general forms of DI, for example 
a core Europe or a Europe of different speeds. This opposition to DI was only spelled out in the 2008 
government programme. Here, the incoming new grand coalition between the social democrats (SPÖ) 
and the Austrian Peoples‘ Party (ÖVP) explicitly rejected the introduction of general forms of DI: 
“Austria will also in the future participate actively, fully and equally in all EU policy areas. We reject 
variable geometries that exclude Austria. Generally, we oppose new dividing lines in Europe (e.g. in the 
form of a core Europe).”12 Until 2013, all government programmes also emphasised the full and active 
                                                     
12 “Österreich wird auch in Zukunft an allen EU-Politikbereichen aktiv gestaltend, voll und gleichberechtigt teilnehmen. 
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participation of Austria in all EU policy areas – including the Common Defence Policy, despite Austria’s 
constitutionally guaranteed neutrality. At the same time, subsidiarity and core EU tasks have always 
been in the focus of the government but have become more strongly emphasised recently, especially 
under Chancellor Kurz since 2017.  
Consecutive Austrian governments have also always been strong supporters of the accession 
prospects of the western Balkans, while the Eastern Partnership is important but emphasised less. 
Regarding the latter, the tone has also become somewhat stricter over time, with the government 
programme in 2013 demanding clear signs of a willingness to reform and emphasising the distinction 
between neighbourhood policy and enlargement.13 The most recent programme, finally, only mentions 
the EU’s neighbourhood in connection with a demand for EU action to stabilise the situation in the 
Mediterranean neighbourhood,14 on the one hand, and with regard to this region’s contribution to the 
EU’s external border security, on the other: “The countries on the EU's external border have earned 
appropriate support from the EU and its Member States in protecting and controlling the external 
border.”15  
The same is true for Turkey. While the customs union with Turkey was not an issue during the period 
under investigation, the official discourse in the government programmes, never fully in favour of 
accession, changed from adhering to the decisions made at the 2002 Copenhagen European Council 
meetings (2003) to advocating slow, careful and open-ended accession negotiations16 and preferring a 
“tailored partnership”17 (2007, 2008, 2013) to explicitly opposing accession and searching for allies in 
favour of a “neighbourhood concept” (2017).18  
The issues discussed above suggest that at least with regard to EU external relations the Austrian 
government’s vision is somewhat akin to a Europe of concentric circles, with the western Balkans 
becoming members of the EU, while other countries in the eastern neighbourhood and Turkey remain, 
at least for the foreseeable future, in an outer circle. 
A somewhat similar position has also been advocated by the Kurz ÖVP/Greens government since 
2020 with regard to the eurozone. The programme makes it clear that “no country may enter the 
eurozone unless it fully and sustainably fulfils the criteria.” In addition, there are clear demands both 
that all members stick to the rules and that those who do not, regarding the budget rules or the rule of 
                                                     
in Europa (etwa in Form eines Kerneuropa) aus.” Regierungsprogramm 2008-2013, p. 238. All translations from German 
are by the authors.  
13 “Die Bundesregierung wird sich weiterhin sowohl mit Hilfe der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik als auch bilateral dafür 
einsetzen, dass die östlichen Nachbarstaaten der EU, wie die Ukraine, Moldau, Weißrussland und der Südkaukasus, 
insbesondere in den Bereichen Demokratisierung, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechte, Fortschritte erzielen. Weitere 
Schritte können nur erfolgen, wenn der Reformwille ausreichend erkennbar ist, wobei klar zwischen der 
Nachbarschaftspolitik und der EU-Erweiterung zu unterscheiden ist.” (2013 Government programme, p. 79). 
14 “Verstärkter Einsatz Europas zur Stabilisierung der Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten in der EU-Nachbarschaft” (2020 
Government programme, p. 179). 
15 “Die Länder an der EU-Außengrenze haben sich entsprechende Unterstützung der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten beim 
Schutz und der Kontrolle der Außengrenze verdient” (2020 Government Programme, p. 178). 
16 “Ein gezieltes und zugleich behutsames Heranführen der Türkei und ihrer Bevölkerung an europäische Werte und 
Standards ist im Interesse aller Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union. Österreich hat durchgesetzt, dass die 
Verhandlungen mit der Türkei einen offenen Ausgang haben. Wir setzen uns für ein schrittweises Vorgehen zunächst mit 
dem Ziel einer maßgeschneiderten türkisch-europäischen Gemeinschaft ein” (Regierungsprogramm 2007, p. 7f.). The 
formulation in the 2008 programme is exactly the same. See 2008 Government programme, p. 242f. 
17 “Österreich setzt sich für eine maßgeschneiderte Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und der Türkei ein. Einem darüber 
hinausgehenden Verhandlungsergebnis kann nur mit Einbindung der österreichischen Bevölkerung zugestimmt werden” 
(2013 Government programme, p. 78). 
18 “Klare Politik gegenüber der Türkei: Keine Zustimmung zu einem EU-Beitritt der Türkei. Verbündete zur Erreichung des 
endgültigen Abbruchs der EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen zu Gunsten eines Europäisch-Türkischen Nachbarschaftskonzeptes 
werden gesucht” (2017 Government programme, p. 23). 
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law, are to be sanctioned.19 A similar demand is made regarding “effective sanctions for Member States 
which violate the Dublin Agreement by tolerating illegal migration to central Europe and do not act 
against human traffickers.”20 
At the same time, according to the 2020 programme, “Austria positions itself in the EU in favour of 
a new [working] together rather than the old [working] against each other.”21 This also featured in the 
speeches by Chancellor Kurz on the occasion of the 2018 Austrian Council presidency. Kurz made a 
reference to “first and second class members” in the speeches, but in relation to a general increase in 
conflict and dividing lines among groups of Member States and not specifically in relation to DI: “I have 
the feeling that it has become much more common among the Member States that one group complains 
about the other, the north about the south, the west about the east and vice-versa. I, in turn, believe in a 
united Europe, a Europe of cooperation and a Europe in which first- and second-class Member States 
do not exist.”22  
The two issues mentioned above seem to be, however, two sides of the same coin in that the Austrian 
government seems to regard the EU as a community of equal and closely cooperating members with the 
same rights and responsibilities. This also implies a community with clear rules that ought to apply to 
all members. As a result, the community as a whole, and subgroups such as the eurozone, are, at least 
in principle, open to all that are willing and able to abide by the rules.  
3.1.2 DI mechanisms and instances 
Specific mechanisms and instances of DI are occasionally supported, yet only as a second-best 
alternative if the underlying goal cannot be reached with all Member States. This is, for example, the 
case of the financial transaction tax, where Austrian governments over the whole period under 
observation were strong supporters of an EU-wide, and ideally even global, introduction, but finally 
willing to settle for an introduction through enhanced cooperation. In a 2010 EU declaration, for 
example, Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Pröll, ÖVP, reported on the efforts of the Austrian 
government regarding an EU-wide introduction: “On the financial transaction tax and tax measures at 
the EU level: Yes, I am for the financial transaction tax. At the meeting of the Euroministers we also 
made sure that there is a common agreement on the development of this tax and that we push this 
financial transaction tax massively at the EU level.”23 In July 2012, the fact that at least a sufficient 
number of Member States were ready to move ahead was celebrated as a success by SPÖ Chancellor 
Faymann in his report on a European Council Meeting: “Let me also report on the success that the 
                                                     
19 “Europa ist eine Verantwortungs- und Solidargemeinschaft. Wer sich nicht an die gemeinsamen Regeln hält, muss mit 
Sanktionen rechnen. Es braucht eine klare Haltung der EU-Kommission gegenüber Budgetsündern. Es darf ausnahmslos 
kein Land der Euro-Zone beitreten, das die Kriterien nicht vollständig und nachhaltig erfüllt. Stärkung des bestehenden 
Rechtsstaatlichkeitsrahmens und wirksamere Sanktionen bei Verstößen. Denn Rechtsstaatlichkeit ist eine 
Grundvoraussetzung für die EU-Mitgliedschaft” (2020 Government programme, p. 175). 
20 “es braucht wirksame Sanktionen für Mitgliedstaaten, die das Dublin-Abkommen brechen, indem sie illegale Migration 
nach Mitteleuropa zulassen und nicht gegen Schlepperei vorgehen” (2020 Government programme, p. 178). 
21 “Österreich positioniert sich in der EU für ein neues Miteinander statt Rückkehr zu altem Gegeneinander” (2020 
Government programme, p. 175). 
22 “Und ich habe das Gefühl, dass es unter den Mitgliedstaaten viel zu stark eingerissen ist, dass die einen über die anderen 
klagen, der Norden über den Süden, der Westen über den Osten und umgekehrt. Ich glaube vielmehr an ein gemeinsames 
Europa, an ein Europa der Zusammenarbeit und an ein Europa, in dem es nicht Mitgliedstaaten erster und zweiter Klasse 
gibt” (Kurz Speech in EP, 3 July 2018). 
23 “Zur Finanztransaktionssteuer und den steuerlichen Maßnahmen auf europäischer Ebene: Ja, ich bin für die 
Finanztransaktionssteuer. Wir haben beim Treffen der Eurominister auch dafür gesorgt, dass es eine einhellige 
Zustimmung zur Erarbeitung und Entwicklung dieser Steuer gibt und dass wir diese Finanztransaktionssteuer auf 
europäischer Ebene massiv vorantreiben. Es muss gelingen, dass dieses Instrument nicht nur in der Frage der 
Finanzierung, sondern auch im Sinne des Prinzips von mehr Transparenz in der Europäischen Union Realität wird” 
(Nationalrat plenary debate, 19 May 2010, p. 29). 
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financial transaction tax has also received to date, namely December 2012. The formulation in the 
declaration is as follows. ‘Therefore, several Member States will submit applications for the 
establishment of enhanced cooperation in this area so that the tax can be approved in December 2012.’ 
End of quote. This is more than general assurance, this is a correct necessary step in the interest of our 
common decision.”24 
In addition, Austrian governments have generally been critical of opt-outs, for example regarding 
the British opt-out from the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. As Chancellor Gusenbauer, SPÖ, 
stated in November 2007, “one should not omit the fact that there is, of course, a fly in the ointment […] 
that Great Britain has opted out – we will see whether Poland will do so as well […] one has to ask the 
question of how the future development of Europe will look if individual states continue to opt out of 
common European policies. That will lead to a certain confusion in Europe and does not accomplish the 
real aim of the European project. I have a lot of empathy for national sensitivities in this context but our 
goal … is a Europe with the same rights and obligations for all.”25 Here, remarks in the context of an 
EU declaration, also by Chancellor Gusenbauer in July 2007, sound almost like a premonition: “Then 
there are a number of states, and Great Britain first of all, which had an opt-out on many questions 
already in the past and now has one regarding the Charter of Fundamental Rights as well. With regard 
to Great Britain, one will, of course, have to pose the question of how the relationship with the European 
Union and Europe ought to look if there are ever more questions where Great Britain does not participate 
in the integration of Europe. But that is a discussion that has to be held mainly there and that will, in the 
end, also be decided in Great Britain.”26 At the same time, as was shown earlier, Austrian governments 
have also, again on occasion, not just supported but actively pursued the inclusion of specific opt-out 
options in EU legislation, for example regarding GMOs.  
3.2 Parliamentary Debates 
The final part of this analysis focuses on parliamentary debates in depth. We selected for the analysis 
all plenary debates in the years 2008, 2012 and from 2017 to 2019 in which either a DI model or the 
enhanced cooperation or opt-out DI mechanisms were mentioned. This resulted in 14 plenary sessions 
and 49 coded segments, which is again a strong indicator of the overall low salience of DI in Austria. 
The programmes were coded manually using MAXQDA. Figure 12 provides an overview. 
                                                     
24 “Lassen Sie mich noch über den Erfolg berichten, dass auch die Finanztransaktionssteuer hinsichtlich der Vorgehensweise 
ein Datum bekommen hat, konkret den Dezember 2012. Die Formulierung in den Schlusserklärungen lautet: Deshalb 
werden mehrere Mitgliedstaaten einen Antrag auf Begründung einer Verstärkten Zusammenarbeit in diesem Bereich 
stellen, damit die Steuer im Dezember 2012 angenommen werden kann. – Zitatende. Das ist mehr als allgemeine 
Beteuerung, das ist ein richtiger, notwendiger Schritt im Interesse unseres gemeinsamen Beschlusses” (Nationalrat plenary 
debate 4 July 2012, p. 54). 
25 “Meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren, man soll dabei nicht verschweigen, dass es natürlich Wermutstropfen gibt, wie 
zum Beispiel den Wermutstropfen, dass Großbritannien sich ein Opt-out genommen hat – ob es Polen letztendlich auch 
noch sein wird oder nicht, wird sich noch herausstellen […] weil man sich auch die Frage stellen muss, wie die weitere 
Entwicklung Europas aussieht, wenn einzelne Staaten sich von der gemeinsamen europäischen Politik immer wieder ein 
Opt-out nehmen. Das führt nämlich zu einer gewissen Unübersichtlichkeit in Europa und erreicht nicht das, was eigentlich 
das Ziel des europäischen Projekts ist. Ich habe viel Verständnis für nationale Befindlichkeiten in diesem Zusammenhang, 
aber unser Ziel wird weiterhin bleiben […], dass wir ein Europa haben, wo es gleiches Recht für alle gibt” (Nationalrat 
plenary debate, 8 November 2007, p. 38). 
26 “Dann gibt es noch eine Reihe von Staaten, in erster Linie Großbritannien, das ein Optout bei vielen Fragen bereits in der 
Vergangenheit hatte und nun dieses auch in der Frage der Grundrechtecharta hat. Daher wird man sich natürlich vor 
allem in Bezug auf Großbritannien die Frage stellen müssen, wie das Verhältnis zur Europäischen Union und zu Europa 
aussehen soll, wenn es immer mehr Fragen gibt, wo Großbritannien nicht an der Einigung Europas beteiligt ist. Aber das 
ist eine Diskussion, die vor allem dort geführt werden muss und die letztendlich auch in Großbritannien entschieden wird” 
(Nationalrat plenary debate, 6 July 2007, p. 99).  
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Figure 12 - Mentions of DI models and mechanisms in parliamentary debates 2004-2019 by 
government status (absolute numbers) 
 
3.2.1 DI models 
As Figure 12 above and Table 1 show, DI models were more salient for the opposition and mostly in 
2008 and 2012. This is almost exclusively due to contributions by the extreme right populist opposition 
party Alliance for the Future of Austria (Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ).  
Figure 13 - References to and assessments of DI models by government and opposition actors 
Multi-speed Europe (two-speed, multi-speed, coalition of the willing) 
(n = 13) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government  1 0 3 
Opposition  4 1 4 
2008 1 0 3 
2012 1 1 4 
2017-2019 3 0 0 
 
Multi-end Europe (core Europe + Europe à la carte) 
(n = 18) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government  3 0 0 
Opposition 2 1 11 
Neither (during 
caretaker gov.) 
1   
2008 5 1 8 
2012 0 0 3 
2017-2019 1 0 0 
 
The position of the BZÖ opposition  
The BZÖ was founded in 2005 by former FPÖ party leader Jörg Haider and other members of the FPÖ 
and took the place of the FPÖ in the government coalition until 2006. In 2008 and 2012, the BZÖ was 
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FPÖ, which advocated Austria exiting from the EU at the time, from the beginning the BZÖ supported 
Austrian membership of the EU but argued in favour of the development of a strong core Europe 
consisting of the economically strong Member States. This became very clear in the debates taking place 
in 2008 in the context of the Lisbon Treaty: “We have an idea – we don't just want to criticise – how to 
make this Europe better, namely democratically. This is why I am proposing a resolution […] where we 
want a renegotiation of the European Treaty, where we want to create a core Europe with the highest 
level of integration. The peoples [of the Member States] should decide themselves if they want to 
participate or not through referendums” (MP Herbert Scheibner, BZÖ, 9 April 2008).27 The motion for 
the resolution, however, makes it clear that the BZÖ had a very specific core Europe in mind, that of the 
European net payers: “The Federal Chancellor and the Federal Minister for European and International 
Affairs are tasked with advocating, at the European level, in the European Councils and the relevant 
sectoral councils, the following measures in the interest of a Europe of citizens aimed at peace and 
prosperity: the renegotiation of a Treaty for Europe with regard to a complete institutional and legal 
(including the competencies) reform of the European Union with the aim of creating a Federation of 
European states (core Europe of net payers) with the participation of Austria” (emphasis added).28 
The BZÖ repeated its argument in the following debate in July 2008 with a clear reference to the 
2007 enlargement: “We want a different, a new Europe. […] What is clear is that this Europe of 27 can 
no longer function with these [existing] mechanisms. That is impossible. We need a new Europe, we 
need new structures. That’s why we advocate a Europe of different speeds. One can’t compare Austria 
and Germany and Holland and Great Britain with those which newly joined: with Romania, with 
Bulgaria and other countries. They can’t all be tarred with the same brush. That’s why we said there 
must be a core Europe, a core of the European Union of the best developed countries” (MP Herbert 
Scheibner, BZÖ, 8 July 2008, emphasis added).29  
The positions of the government and other opposition parties 
For the other parties, either in government or in opposition, DI models such as a core Europe or a Europe 
of two/different speeds were rarely an issue. DI was very occasionally raised by some MPs in the debates 
mentioned above as a response to the BZÖ demands and always negatively.  
Overall, the debate contributions again illustrate the positions of the Austrian government and the 
mainstream parties. DI as a general model for integration is not seen as an opportunity for closer 
cooperation between specific Member States but as an undesirable system where each member would 
be able to choose what rules it wants to abide by. This is also observable from the fact that the BZÖ 
tends to use the term ‘core Europe’ with a positive connotation in the analysed debates while MPs from 
                                                     
27 “Wir haben eine Idee – wir wollen nicht nur kritisieren –, wie dieses Europa besser werden kann, und zwar demokratisch. 
Deshalb bringe ich einen Entschließungsantrag der Abgeordneten Scheibner und Westenthaler ein, wo wir eine 
Neuverhandlung des Vertrages für Europa haben wollen, wo wir ein Kerneuropa schaffen wollen mit höchstem Maß an 
Integration.” (Nationalrat plenary debate 9 April 2008, p. 129). 
28 “Der Bundeskanzler sowie die Bundesministerin für europäische und internationale Angelegenheiten werden aufgefordert, 
sich auf Europäischer Ebene, bei den Europäischen Räten sowie den entsprechenden Fachministerräten für die Umsetzung 
nachstehender Maßnahmen im Interesse eines auf Frieden und Wohlstand abzielenden Europas der Bürgerinnen und 
Bürger einzusetzen: Neuverhandlung eines Vertrags für Europa in Hinblick auf eine vollständige institutionelle und 
(kompetenz-) rechtliche Reform der Europäischen Union mit dem Ziel der Schaffung eines Bundes Europäischer Staaten 
(Kerneuropa der Nettozahler) unter Teilnahme Österreichs.” (Motion reprinted in stenographic minutes, Nationalrat 
plenary debate, 9 April 2008, p. 130 ff.) 
29 “Wir wollen ein anderes, ein neues Europa. Wir haben schon klar gesagt – ob man nationale Volksabstimmungen einführt 
oder nicht –: Klar ist, dieses Europa der 27 kann mit diesen Mechanismen nicht mehr funktionieren. Das ist unmöglich. 
Wir brauchen ein neues Europa, wir brauchen neue Strukturen. Deshalb setzen wir uns für ein Europa der verschiedenen 
Geschwindigkeiten ein. Sie können Österreich und Deutschland und Holland und Großbritannien nicht mit den Ländern 
vergleichen, die neu dazugekommen sind: mit Rumänien, mit Bulgarien und anderen Ländern. Das kann nicht über einen 
Kamm geschoren werden. Deshalb haben wir gesagt, es muss ein Kerneuropa geben, einen Kern der Europäischen Union 
der bestentwickelten Länder.” (Nationalrat plenary debate, 8 July 2008, p. 56.) 
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the mainstream parties, by contrast, instead refer to ‘Europe à la carte,’ which has a more negative 
connotation, as the following quotes from ÖVP MPs illustrate: “With 500 million people and 27 states, 
there will be no Europe à la carte, where anyone can practically choose in a modular system what they 
like best; there must be rules of the game”(MP and former Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel, ÖVP, 9 April 
2008);30 “A Europe à la carte, where each partner only chooses what they like most, cannot be our goal, 
just like a Europe that has to follow the slowest ship in the convoy” (MP Carmen Jeitler-Cincelli, ÖVP, 
citing Helmut Kohl, 13 November 2019).31 Similarly, replying directly to a BZÖ intervention, a 
government representative from the SPÖ argued, “I found the remarks […] on the two speeds 
interesting. If a car were travelling with two different speeds – left axis, right side – that vehicle would 
normally get torn apart. Europe would, of course, face the same danger. You just now voted in favour 
of Croatia’s accession, where the referendum was similarly successful as in Austria at the time, i.e. 66 
per cent and a bit. What would interest me is did you vote in favour of accession to the slow or the fast 
speed, if that existed? That alone shows there is one speed, there is one Europe. That the complexity of 
decisions with such a large system is obviously great, that complex decision-making structures exist, 
that we know” (Junior Minister [Staatssekretär] Dr. Josef Ostermayer, SPÖ, 4 July 2012).32 
3.2.2 DI mechanisms  
A positive connotation of DI for the government and mainstream parties exists almost exclusively with 
regard to very specific and limited instances of DI and the introduction of the financial transaction tax 
in particular, which is also supported by the opposition (Table 2). This instance of DI is, however, rarely 
mentioned in connection with the related enhanced cooperation mechanism, which is why Table 2 
features relatively few hits. As the earlier analysis of parliamentary debates showed, the financial 
transactions tax was indeed a comparatively salient topic. In this context, members of the governing 
parties also used the term ‘coalition of the willing,’ which otherwise pops up very rarely: “One will also 
have to see that we […] finally get through with the Austrian demand for a financial transaction tax, that 
we can at least get a coalition of the willing together in the eurozone among the 17 states and really 
implement this financial transaction tax”33 (Federal Councillor (FC) Gottfried Kneifel, ÖVP, 4 October 
2012). “In the fight against the crisis, and for budget consolidation – which is very, very important – we 
need growth impulses and growth areas but also the financial transaction tax, and therefore the decisions 
which ECOFIN and the summit have made, namely that the blockade by individual countries is 
overcome and the way is cleared so that the coalition of the willing – those states willing to introduce 
                                                     
30 “Meine Damen und Herren, es wird mit 500 Millionen Menschen und 27 Staaten kein Europa à la carte geben, wo sich 
quasi jeder im Modulsystem aussuchen kann, was ihm am besten passt, sondern es braucht Spielregeln.” (Nationalrat 
plenary debate, 9 April 2008, p. 104.) 
31 “Ein Europa à la carte, bei dem jeder der Partner nur das aussucht, was ihm an diesem Europa besonders zusagt, kann 
ebenso wenig unser Ziel sein wie ein Europa, das sich am langsamsten Schiff im Geleitzug ausrichten muss.” (Nationalrat 
plenary debate, 13 November 2019, p. 3.) 
32 “Interessant habe ich die Ausführungen des Kollegen Scheibner mit den zwei Geschwindigkeiten gefunden. Würde ein Auto 
mit zwei Geschwindigkeiten unterwegs sein – linke Achse, rechte Seite –, dann würde es ein Vehikel normalerweise 
zerreißen. Diese Gefahr würde natürlich bei Europa genauso bestehen. Ich glaube, Sie haben vorhin dem Beitritt Kroatiens 
zugestimmt, wo ja die Volksabstimmung ähnlich erfolgreich war wie damals in Österreich, also 66 Komma ein bisschen 
etwas Prozent. Was mich natürlich interessieren würde, ist: Haben Sie jetzt dem Beitritt zur langsameren oder zur 
schnelleren Geschwindigkeit zugestimmt, wenn es das gäbe? Das zeigt ja schon, es gibt eine Geschwindigkeit, es gibt ein 
Europa. Dass die Komplexität von Entscheidungen bei so einem großen Gebilde natürlich groß ist, dass dort komplexe 
Entscheidungsstrukturen vorliegen, wissen wir ja.” (Nationalrat plenary debate, 4 July 2012, p. 230.) 
33 “Es wird auch zu schauen sein, dass wir – und auch der neue Staatssekretär wird dazu beitragen – endlich mit der 
österreichischen Forderung nach einer Finanztransaktionssteuer durchkommen, dass wir zumindest in der Euro-Zone 
unter den 17 Staaten die Koalition der Willigen zustande bringen und diese Finanztransaktionssteuer auch wirklich 
umsetzen” (Bundesrat plenary debate, 4 October 2012, p. 51). 
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the financial transaction tax – can also introduce it” (Junior Minister [Staatssekretär] Andreas Schieder, 
SPÖ, 4 July 2012).34  
Figure 14 - References to and assessments of the enhanced cooperation and opt-out DI 
mechanisms by government and opposition actors 
Enhanced Cooperation 
(n = 16) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government  0 0 12 
Opposition  0 1 3 
2008 0 1 12 
2012 0 0 2 
2017-2019 0 0 1 
 
Opt-out 
(n = 2) Negative Neutral Positive 
Government  1 0 0 
Opposition 1 0 0 
2008 1 0 1 
2012 0 0 0 
2017-2019 0 0 0 
Opt-outs, which were almost never mentioned during this period, were exclusively seen as negative 
(Table 2). In the two cases in which they were, the debate contributions, once by the opposition and 
once by the government, referred to British opt-outs from the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Social Chapter. 
4. Conclusion 
To summarise, differentiated integration is overall not a salient issue in Austria, at least with regard to 
general concepts and models. While specific instances of DI are, of course, very salient, DI as a more 
general topic has come up only very infrequently in both government speeches and parliamentary 
debates since 2004. Overall, most Austrian parties are not in favour of DI, quite the opposite. While the 
subsidiarity principle and a focus on the main tasks of the European Union (EU) have always been an 
important aspect of Austrian discourse, the vision for the EU is that of a community of Member States 
with the same rights and responsibilities, where opt-outs are seen as cherry picking. DI is therefore only 
occasionally supported as the second-best option for an EU-wide provision as, for example, in the case 
of the financial transaction tax. The only outspoken supporter of DI in the form of a core Europe was 
the right-wing populist BZÖ, which mainly used the concept to advocate a closer integration among the 
richer Member States (net payers) while excluding the financially more vulnerable.  
Exceptions were the financial transaction tax discussed in the context of the enhanced cooperation 
mechanism and, regarding the opt-out mechanism, the introduction of a general opt-out option for all 
Member States from (certain) genetically modified organisms (GMO), and a limited domestic opt-out 
for hospital staff from the working time directive. 
                                                     
34 “Wir brauchen zur Krisenbekämpfung, wir brauchen auch zur Budgetkonsolidierung – das ist ganz, ganz wichtig – 
Wachstumsimpulse und Wachstumsbereiche, aber auch die Finanztransaktionssteuer und deshalb die Entscheidungen, die 
der ECOFIN und der Gipfel gebracht haben, nämlich dass jetzt endlich die Blockade einzelner Länder überwunden wird 
und der Weg frei ist, dass die Koalition der Willigen – jener Staaten, die bereit sind, die Finanztransaktionssteuer 
einzuführen – diese auch einführen können” (Nationalrat, plenary debate, 4 July 2012, p. 129). 
The Politics of Differentiated Integration: What do Governments Want? Country Report – Austria 
European University Institute 19 
Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 Overview of the documents analysed 
 
 Category of document Time period Details 
1 Government programmes  2003-2020 2003, 2007, 2008, 2013, 2017, 2020  
(the transition government under Chancellor 
Bierlein in 2019 did not publish a 
government programme)  
2 Government declarations 
and parliamentary debates 
  
2004-2020 Government declarations after each general 
election in both houses of parliament and 
the subsequent debates (years same as 
above plus 2019 [interim Chancellor 
Bierlein])  
3 European Council 
presidency speeches 
and parliamentary debates 
in the European Parliament 
and the Austrian Nationalrat 
2006 and 2018 18 January 2006 (European Parliament) 
25 January 2006 (Austrian Nationalrat)  
14 June 2018 (Austrian Nationalrat) 
3 July 2018 (European Parliament) 
4 Future of Europe speeches  
and parliamentary debates 
n.a. The Austrian Chancellor neither gave a FoE 
speech in the European Parliament nor a 
speech in the Austrian parliament on the 
occasion of the European citizen’s dialogues. 
The kick-off for the citizens’ dialogues was 
celebrated in the context of the Europa-
Forum Wachau in June 2018, but Kurz’s 
speech on this occasion is not available. 
5 Government EU declarations  2004-2020 According to §74, para. 1 of the standing 
orders of the Austrian Nationalrat, the 
Government presents an EU declaration 
twice a year “in close proximity to the 
European Council meetings” 




a) 2004 - 2019 
b) 2008, 2012, 
2017–2019 
 
a) all parliamentary debates during the 
period 
b) documents with one of the following 
keywords: multi-speed Europe, coalition of 
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Appendix 2 Overview of key words (English and German translation) 
  
 English German 
General DI Differentiated integration Differenzierte Integration 
DI Models  
Different Speed 
two-speed Europe/EU Eu* der zwei Geschwindigkeiten 
multi-speed Europe/EU Eu* der unterschiedlichen/verschiedenen 
Geschwindigkeiten 
coalition of the willing  Koalition der Willigen 
DI Models – 
Different End Point 
variable geometry Variable Geometrie 
core Europe / European core Kerneuropa, Kern-Europa, europäisch* Kern,  
two-tier Europe  zweistufig Europa 
concentric circles + EU konzentrisch 
a la carte + EU “a la carte” 
Future of Europe Future of Europe Zukunft Europas, Zukunft der Eu* 
DI Mechanism –  
Enhanced 
Cooperation 
enhanced co-operation Verstärkte Zusammenarbeit 
Rome iii  Rom iii, Rom III, Rom-III, Rom-Kriterien, Rom 
unitary patent  Einheitliches Patent, Einheitspatent, EU-
Patent, Europäisches Patent 
matrimonial property regimes  Eheliche Vermögen, Eigentumsregime, 
eheliches Güterrecht, eheliche Güterstände 
financial transaction tax  Finanztransaktionssteuer, 
Transaktionssteuer, Spekulationssteuer 
European public prosecutor  Europäische Staatsanwaltschaft 
Pesco Pesco, (ständig) strukturierte 
Zusammenarbeit 
DI Mechanism – 
Opt-Out 
Opt-out Opt-out, opt out, opting-out, opting out 
Schengen Schengen 
economic and monetary union  Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, EMU 
security and defence policy  Europäische/gemeinsame Sicherheits- und 
Verteidigungspolitik 
area of freedom, security, and 
justice  
Raum der Freiheit, der Sicherheit und des 
Rechts; RFSR 
charter of fundamental rights  Charta der Grundrechte, Grundrechts-
Charta, Grundrechte-Charta 
social chapter Sozialcharta, Sozialkapitel, Eu* Sozialpolitik 
Intergovernmental 
treaties among EU 
MS 
Prüm convention  Prüm 
European stability mechanism  Eu* Stabilitätsmechanismus; ESM 
fiscal compact  Fiskalpakt 
unified patent court  Einheitliches Patentgericht, europäisches 
Patentgericht, EU-Patentgericht 
single resolution mechanism Einheitlicher 
Bankenabwicklungsmechanismus, 




and third states 
European Economic Area (EEA) Europäischer Wirtschaftsraum, EWR 
customs union + Turkey  Zollunion 
Eastern partnership  Östliche Partnerschaft, Partnerschaft Osten 
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Appendix 3 Breakdown of DI instances mentioned in government programmes related to DI opt-out 






Appendix 4 Breakdown of DI instances related to opt-out in the parliamentary debates following the 





Appendix 5 Breakdown of DI instances related to enhanced cooperation, opt-out and inter se 
agreements in government EU declarations 2004 to 2020 (shares in percentages) 
 















Economic and Monetary Union





parliamentary debates after first speech


























Economic and Monetary Union
Security and Defence Policy
Area of freedom, security, and
justice
Charter of Fundamental Rights
Social Chapter
Katrin Auel and Anna Pixer 








Note: The terms used in the query were all permutations of, in this order, treaty, crisis, Great Britain, British/Brits, (United) Kingdom, Brexit, 
protective shield, security shield 
 
 



























2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Conceptual keywords Future of Europe
2004 2018 
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Appendix 8 Salience of conceptual key words in parliamentary debates in peak years – breakdown by 
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